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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in-
equity aversion as dened by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We dene a separating
equilibrium that explains the co-existence of multiple payment schemes in rms. We
show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about
their own payo¤ but that it is not e¢ cient when agents are inequity averse. In fact,
inequity averse agents are attracted by a revenue-sharing scheme in which the joint
production is equally distributed, under the constraint that selsh agents have no
incentive to join the revenue sharing organization. If the market is perfectly exi-
ble, this separating equilibrium induces a high e¤ort level for both types of agents.
Pareto gains are achieved by o¤ering organizational choice to agents and the optimal
contract is thus to propose both payment schemes to agents and to allow them to
self-select into the di¤erent payment schemes.
JEL Classication: D63, D82, J31, J33, M52
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1 Introduction
Most organizations are divided into units or departments in which every employee does
approximately the same job. In general, the joint-output of the entire unit is observable
by the manager but she is unable to accurately assess individual contributions. At the
same time, rms implement performance-based payment schemes to motivate individual
e¤ort within teams. ODell and McAdams (1987) surveyed reward practises of 1,598 U.S.
organizations and found that around 75% of companies adopt a variable pay to motivate
their employees. Globally, 59% of these rms apply group incentives such as prot-sharing,
gainsharing and small-group incentives, 30% use lump-sum bonuses and 28%, individual
incentives1. The rationale of the existence of a multiplicity of performance-based payment
schemes is however still unclear. It is not obvious that a specic scheme outperforms others.
An hypothesis is that a specic scheme may be more e¢ cient with some agents but not with
all agents, depending on their social preferences. People may choose di¤erent organizational
structures according to their personal preferences and they may lead to better outcomes for
employees and companies. The aim of this paper is to study whether the heterogeneity of
workerssocial preferences, such as inequity aversion, may explain the existence of multiple
organizational structures through workersself-selection. It is important to analyze whether
the existence of multiple variable payment schemes increases the utility of employees and
their individual production, which would raise companiesprots as well.
Lazear (2000) has shown in a study of a large auto glass American company which
switched from a xed wage to a piece-rate pay that this change enhanced the average output
level per worker by 44 percent. This increase is due to both an incentive and a sorting
e¤ect in terms of abilities. Both e¤ects are of the same extent2. Another empirical study
(Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003) on peoples ability heterogeneity explains that the
shift from an individual piece rate payment scheme to a collective one improves workers
productivity provided that people can self-select. It has also been shown that employees
working for a rm using incentive contracts with some income risk are more risk-tolerant
1Note that the sum of percentages is higher than 100% which is due to rms using several reward
systems.
2Higher-ability workers are more attracted by the piece-rate pay and work at a high e¤ort level while
low-ability workers prefer the xed wage.
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than the average worker (Bellemare and Shearer, 2006). These studies demonstrate that
ability, education levels and risk preferences inuence workerschoice of payment scheme.
Individuals di¤er also in their social preferences and we hypothesize that this is likely to
inuence their occupational choice. For instance, physicians, nurses, lawyers, notaries,
real estate agents or accountants decide to start their own business or to work in teams.
Salesmen or, more generally, all employees whose salary includes a variable component
decide to work for companies using individual or collective performance-based payment
schemes. Moreover, people also choose between the public and private sectors.
Recent work indicates that people do have social preferences and that they di¤er in
these preferences. In the standard theory, individuals are assumed to be selsh in the
sense that they are pursuing only their own material payo¤. However, according to Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), "this may be true for some (maybe many) people, but it is certainly
not true for everybody" (p. 817)3. They construct a utility function for inequity averse
people which is decreasing with the spread between agents payo¤s. This means that
di¤erent people like di¤erent organizations to di¤ering degrees. In this connection, there
may be Pareto gains from o¤ering compensation/organizational choice to workers. Lazear
(1989) suggests that "it may be important to sort workers in di¤erent groups depending on
their personality" (p. 562). There may be no need to actually nd out peoples personality
types, at least not directly. A exible market that allows people to select their payment
scheme may get self-selection and then an identication of personality types ex post. Our
model suggests that a separating equilibrium exists and provides better outcomes to both
the principal and the agents.
In our game, we consider that people are either of the selsh type or of the inequity
averse type and that they are matched in groups of two agents with no information con-
cerning the type of their co-worker. The joint-production of each group is observable by
the principal but individual outputs are imperfectly measurable4. The variable payment
3Recent experimental studies show the clear existence of worker types according to their social prefer-
ences (Burlando and Guala (2005), Gächter and Thöni (2005) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2006)) and
underline the necessity to consider this heterogeneity to infer adapted incentives.
4Holmstrom (1982) provides a theoretical analyzis of team incentives with moral hazard. He studies
the free-riding problem and shows that it can be resolved if the owners of the rm and workers are
clearly separated. He also shows that relative performance evaluation decreases costs driven by hidden
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attributed to workers is a positive share of the group joint production. We assume two
possible payment schemes that are a tournament and a revenue-sharing scheme. Tourna-
ments require a relative, rather than absolute, measure of individual outputs and only a
proportion of group-members receive a high prize which can be, for instance, a bonus or
a promotion. In two-workers groups, the payo¤s distribution is degenerated in the sense
that only one worker earns the whole variable pay. The revenue-sharing splits equally the
global production between workers of the same group.
The rst nding of our study is that the tournament is not e¢ cient in terms of incentives
for the whole population. Indeed, selsh agents who only care about their own payo¤realize
a high e¤ort level under the tournament. On the contrary, inequity averse agents have to
support an important disutility due to the large ex post inequality between nal net payo¤s.
Their equilibrium e¤ort level is then very low and may even equal zero. Therefore, working
under the tournament is not protable for inequity averse workers. By o¤ering agents the
choice of their payment scheme, to join a revenue-sharing scheme leads in equilibrium to
a situation where the two types of people have sorted themselves into the two di¤erent
organizations. This situation is stable: workers who do not care about the otherspayo¤
choose the tournament organization and play the unique equilibrium which is a high e¤ort
level; inequity averse workers choose the revenue-sharing organization and exert an e¤ort
level strictly higher than the free-riding equilibrium of a game where all players are selsh,
due to the application of the forward induction concept. This separating equilibrium exists
under the constraint that neither selsh nor inequity averse workers wish to adopt the other
organization5. No agent can be better o¤ in the other organizational structure and as a
consequence should not move.
Moreover, we show that mono-organizational situations, i.e. situations in which all
organizations are built under the same payment scheme, are unstable. On the one hand,
information. Nalbatian and Schotter (1997) investigate experimentaly the e¤ect of various group incentive
payment schemes on workersperformance. They observe, among other results, that relative performance-
based payment schemes have a higher incentive e¤ect than target-based schemes on employeesproduction.
5In a di¤erent theoretical study on teamwork , Kosfeld and von Siemens (2006) show that people self-
select into di¤erent rms when people di¤er in their degree of conditional cooperation and no pooling
equilibrium exists. When agents have heterogeneous productivities, Cabrales and Calvó-Armengol (2007)
show that a sorting of agents by abilities is possible when their social preferences are di¤erent, even slightly,
from selsh considerations.
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if we assume that all individuals work under the tournament organization, people with a
su¢ ciently high degree of inequity aversion prefer to break away for an alternative option6.
On the other hand, if all agents are assumed to work under the revenue-sharing scheme,
selsh people pollute cooperation by shirking and as a consequence, everybody shirks.
Then, inequity averse agents prefer to leave this organization and start another revenue-
sharing organization without selsh people (see Ehrhart and Keser, 1999, for experimental
evidence) which is possible only if a tournament structure exists to attract selsh agents.
Therefore, our model proposes a unique and separating equilibrium through the fact that
workersself-selection leads to homogeneous groups and then to adapted incentive mecha-
nisms for each type of agents. Pareto gains are achieved from o¤ering organizational choice
to workers and the optimal contract is thus to o¤er both payment schemes to agents and
to allow them to self-select into the di¤erent payment schemes.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the heterogeneity of agents in
terms of social preferences. Section 3 presents the tournament model with workersequi-
librium behavior. The possibility to ee the tournament is analyzed in section 4. Section
5 provides the optimal contract proposed by the principal. Section 6 discusses the results
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Heterogeneous people: selsh and inequity averse
agents
We distinguish agents according to their social preferences and, more precisely, to their
degree of inequity aversion. We utilize the inequity aversion concept as dened by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). They present a utility function for inequity averse agents which is
negatively a¤ected by the di¤erence between agentspayo¤s. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
6Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Demougin and Fluet (2003) show that inequity aversion as dened by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) a¤ects workersequilibrium strategies in tournaments. Kräkel (2000) obtains the
same conclusions according to the concept of "relative deprivation" introduced by Stark (1987). The study
on personnel data from an English fruit farm by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) shows that social
preferences of workers have a negative impact on their productivity under relative incentives in presence
of monitoring.
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also propose a fairness model based on distributive consequences but they develop an alter-
native utility function based on the comparison by each agent between their own monetary
payo¤ and the average payo¤ of the reference group. Another literature studying individ-
uals social preferences concentrates on fairness intentions instead of nal distributions.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) analyze intentions for sequential games in continua-
tion of the work done by Rabin (1993) for normal games. The contribution of Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) lies in the consideration of both intentions and outcome distributions
to drive reciprocity. E¢ ciency (see Charness and Rabin, 2002) and maximin preferences
characterize agentssocial preferences too7. Sobel (2005) proposes a survey of this litera-
ture.
The question we address here is whether or not the presence of both selsh and inequity
averse agents a¤ects the e¢ ciency of incentives provided by performance-based compensa-
tion schemes. We assume that the reference group of each agent is their co-worker in the
team. They are neither a¤ected by the payo¤ of agents belonging to another group nor by
the payo¤ of the principal. This assumption seems to be the most adapted to our setting
in which the relationship between members of the same group appears the most evident
and transparent in terms of revenue information. Agents are supposed risk neutral and of
the same ability level.
As in Fehr and Schmidts, the utility function is the following for player i:
ui(xi; xj) = xi   imax fxj   xi; 0g   imax fxi   xj; 0g i 6= j (1)
where xi and xj represent the monetary payo¤s of i and j. Inequity averse individuals
are assumed to be averse to both advantageous (represented by the parameter i) and
disadvantageous inequality (represented by the parameter i). Moreover, earning less
than the other player has a bigger negative impact on utility than earning more, which
can be written: i  i8 with 0  i < 1. On the one hand, i < 1 captures the idea
that the utility of worker i is always increased when his payo¤ rises: he is not prepared
7For an experimental comparison between these models, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
8If the renunciation of a fraction of the monetary payo¤ is lower than the gain induced by the inequality
reduction, the choice of the player is rational. This is possible even for i > 1. Also, i does not need to
be upper-bounded.
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to give up more (or the same amount) than his monetary payo¤ to reduce the inequality
otherwise, being rational, his utility is reduced. On the other hand, Fehr and Schmidt
exclude subjects who like earning more than others (i < 0) but, aware that this kind
of preferences may exist, they show at the end of their paper that this restriction did not
change the results in the games they considered. However, we can expect that the existence
of this type of agents may a¤ect the equilibrium behavior in incentive games. Also, in this
paper, we allow  1 < i < 0 to capture the spitefulness of players9. We assume i  jij.
We consider an innite population and two types of workers, t 2 ftS; tAg. A proportion
of workers , 0    1, are inequity averse people with at least  6= 0 or  6= 0 and
  jj and  1 <  < 1; they are workers of type tA. (1  ) players, the type tS workers,
are supposed totally selsh, i.e.  =  = 0. For simplicity, we suppose all type tA workers
to have the same level of inequity aversion.
3 The tournament
Rank-order tournaments have a strong incentive power when agents are assumed to be
selsh. We will show in this section that a tournament does not provide the same incentive
e¤ect if agents have social preferences. Inequity averse workers may be negatively a¤ected
by the high ex-post payo¤ inequality generated by the tournament. After a denition of
the game and of the payment device under the tournament, we determine equilibrium
e¤ort levels in pure strategies and related utilities for both types of agents. We rst derive
the equilibrium behavior of workers under complete information in the sense that the
type of agents is observable at no cost. Then, we introduce private information concerning
workerstype. We study the variation of equilibrium variables in function of agentsdegree
of inequity aversion.
3.1 Agentsoutput and payment device
Agents, after being matched in pairs, produce a joint output that depends exclusively
on their e¤ort level. In each pair, they choose simultaneously their level of e¤ort. The
9Frank (1985) and Mui (1995) relate the role of status seeking and envy.
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principal cannot observe individual contributions with certainty. Worker i produces the
output ei, ei  0, which represents his e¤ort level. Agents who opt for a positive e¤ort level
are submitted to a quadratic cost function, c(ei), such that c(ei) = e2i . We assume agents
identical in terms of ability then, the production technology and the e¤ort cost function are
the same for all workers10. The output produced by worker i is always higher than his cost
to get this output level: ei  e2i () ei 2 [0; 1]. The net payo¤ of worker i is the di¤erence
between the gross payment he received depending on e¤ort levels exerted by both workers
in the group, pi(ei; ej), and the cost associated to his e¤ort level, xi = pi(ei; ej)   e2i . We
assume here that agents are sensitive to inequality generated by nal net payo¤s instead
of expected payo¤s, which seems closer to the idea of the Fehr and Schmidts model.
Moreover, in a real company setting, as workers are able to observe the e¤ort level of their
co-worker and link their payo¤ and their investment in the task, it seems more realistic
that they compare their nal payo¤s once the cost of e¤ort is deduced.
Each groups joint production is supposed perfectly observable by the principal but
she is unable to determine which amount of e¤ort is due to each worker. As workers
can lie about their e¤ort contribution, she must use a performance-based compensation
scheme in order to give employees incentives to work. We consider that workers receive
a share  ,  2 [0; 1], of the group joint-output, Q, Q = ei + ej. The tournament is
not based on an absolute measure of the individual production. In fact, in each group of
workers, individuals are rewarded according to the rank of their performance relative to the
performance of other agents in the group. Prizes rewarded to agents are not xed payments
but are endogenous to the group output in order to avoid collusion problems. Therefore,
the "winner" of the tournament earns the whole variable prize, W (ei; ej) = Q, with 
chosen by the principal to maximize his prots, and the "loser" does not earn anything,
L = 0. Keeping in mind that the individual output is not perfectly observable, we consider
that the winner is not the worker with the highest e¤ort level with certainty. According to
the Tullock model (1980), the probability of earning the winners prize for each employee
10Workersequilibrium behavior has been derived also when the production function is f(ei) such that
f 0(ei) > 0 and f 00(ei)  0 and the cost function is c(ei) such that c0(ei) > 0 and c00(ei) > 0. The results
are not qualitatively modied so, for simplicity, we assume f(ei) = ei and c(ei) = e2i .
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depends on the ratio between his own output and the group joint production:
Pr (pi(ei; ej) =W (ei; ej)) = Pr (pi = W ) =
ei
Q
(2)
The probability of winning the prize W (ei; ej) is increasing in the workers e¤ort.
3.2 Agentsequilibrium behavior
The von Neuman-Morgenstern utility of agent i is increasing in the payo¤ he earns and
decreasing in his cost of e¤ort. It is given by:
E [Vi(ei; ej)] = Pr (pi = W ) :vi(W ) + (1  Pr (pi = W )) :vi(L) i 6= j (3)
The utility associated with prizes di¤ers according to agentssocial preferences. Theoretical
literature on tournaments shows that this payment scheme provides important incentives to
work hard when employees exclusively care about their own payo¤. Nevertheless, the result
may be di¤erent when workersutility depends on the other group-members payment.
Indeed, a rank-order tournament induces a low expected utility for inequity averse agents
by generating a dramatic ex post inequity when nal net of cost payo¤s are compared.
The utility of agent i of type tA is11:8<: vi(W ) = Q  e2i   

Q  e2i + e2j

vi(L) =  e2i   

Q  e2j + e2i
 if he wins the tournament
if he loses the tournament
The expected utility of an inequity averse agent i is then decreasing in  and :
E [Vi(ei; ej)] =
ei
Q

Q    Q   e2i   e2j+ ejQ    Q+  e2i   e2j  e2i (4)
If we consider an agent k who is only interested in his own payo¤, his utility depends
exclusively on his own e¤ort level:
E [Vk(ek)] = ek   e2k 8ej (5)
As workers nd their equilibrium strategy by maximizing their expected utility function,
selsh people have a dominant strategy whatever the type of the other worker in the group
11We insure that the winner of the tournament earns always more than the loser: Q  e2i > e2j ()  
e2i+e
2
j
Q ; it is veried at the equilibrium.
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is:
eS =

2
The equilibrium e¤ort level is increasing with the share of the output given to workers.
Inequity averse agents have a di¤erent behavior according to their opponents type12.
Under complete information about the type of their co-worker in the group, the equilibrium
strategy of an agent of type tA is:
eAAA =
2 (1  )
2 +    e

S if his opponent is of type tA as well
eASA =
8<:
2  3
2(1 ) e

S
0
if + 3 < 2
otherwise
if his opponent is of type tS
Proposition 1 Under complete information, groups composed exclusively of selsh agents
produce a higher output than groups containing at least one inequity averse agent: eS >
eAAA and e

S > e
AS
A . Heterogeneous groups provide the worst outcome: e
AA
A > e
AS
A .
The equilibrium e¤ort level for an inequity averse agent is decreasing in his degrees of ad-
vantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion.
The equilibrium e¤ort level of an agent of type tA is decreasing with  and  what-
ever the type of his co-worker is. This decline is larger with reference to an increase of
 compared to an increase of . Consequently, in this case, the tournament does not
provide good incentives to inequity averse workers if  and  are high. Indeed, type tA
workers with  + 3  2 exert no e¤ort at the equilibrium. Groups including one or two
inequity averse workers produce a lower performance than groups exclusively composed of
selsh workers. This di¤erence depends on the values of  and ; the higher the workers
advantageous and/or disadvantageous inequity aversion, the lower the joint-production of
the group. Besides, when agents types are not private information, we can infer from the
reaction function of a type tA worker that his equilibrium e¤ort level is decreasing with the
e¤ort level of his co-worker. An inequity averse worker exerts an even lower performance
12The reaction function of a type tA worker competing against a worker j, deduced from the maximization
of his utility function, is: eAjA (ej) =

2   +2(1 )ej .
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when he faces a selsh worker compared to the situation where his opponent is inequity
averse too. We can see that an inequity averse worker facing another type tA worker always
provides a positive e¤ort level whatever  and  are, whereas an inequity averse worker
facing a selsh one chooses a zero e¤ort level as soon as + 3  2.
Proposition 1 is established under the assumption that each agents type is common
knowledge. Next, we relax this assumption and assume instead that only the proportion
of inequity averse people in the working population is known by agents. Type tA workers
must maximize their expected utility knowing only the probability to compete against a
selsh or another inequity averse employee. Aware that the equilibrium e¤ort level of
inequity averse agents decreases as their co-workers e¤ort level increases, we deduce that
the equilibrium e¤ort level of inequity averse workers under incomplete information is lower
than their e¤ort level when it is common knowledge that they face another inequity averse
worker and bigger than their e¤ort level when they face a selsh worker. Their equilibrium
e¤ort level is increasing in the proportion of inequity averse workers in the sample13:
eA =
8<:
2  3+(+)
2(1 )+(+) e

S
0
if  (1  ) +  (3  ) < 2
otherwise
Corollary 1 Under incomplete information, there exists a unique Bayesian equilibrium
such that the equilibrium strategy of an inequity averse agent, increasing with , is eA 2
eASA ; e
AA
A

and the equilibrium strategy of a selsh agent is his dominant strategy, eS.
The equilibrium e¤ort level of inequity averse agents is obviously lower than the equi-
librium e¤ort level of selsh agents and is decreasing with the number of selsh agents in
the population. Under both complete and incomplete informational situations, the two
types of agents have a di¤erent equilibrium behavior under the tournament. Their utility
is then a¤ected as well. Contrary to selsh agents, type tA workers derive a very low, even
negative in some cases, expected utility when their degree of inequity aversion is high, due
to the degenerated allocation of incomes. We will analyze inequity averse agentsutility
according to their degree of inequity aversion and the composition of their group.
13The number of workers supposed to be innite, the type of one particular individual does not a¤ect
his beliefs about his opponants type.
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Under complete information about the other group-members type, an inequity averse
agent derives a higher expected utility if his opponent is inequity averse too rather than
when he is selsh. Whatever  and  are and respecting the assumptions described in
section 2, we obtain:
E

VA
 
eAAA ; e
AA
A
  E VA  eASA ; eS 8; ;   jj and   1 <  < 1 (6)
At the equilibrium, the expected utility of an inequity averse worker is decreasing with 
whatever the type of the other group-member. When  is increasing, its negative e¤ect on
workersutility is clear if the group is heterogeneous. The decline of the utility due to an
increase of  is slower than the one induced by an increase of . Further, if the group is
composed of two inequity averse agents, when  and  reach a su¢ ciently high level, the
equilibrium expected utility is increasing in . It is due to the decrease of both workers
e¤ort level.
Under incomplete information, the equilibrium expected utility of inequity averse work-
ers, IIE [VA] = E [VA(eA; e

A)] + (1   )E [VA(eA; eS)], increases as the proportion of the
population with social preferences rises. This result is obtained because their equilibrium
expected utility is higher when the group is homogeneous than when they compete against
a selsh employee, as in the full information situation:
E [VA (e

A; e

A)]  E [VA (eA; eS)]8; ;   jj and   1 <  < 1 (7)
In this section, we have demonstrated that inequity averse and selsh agents do not have
the same equilibrium behavior when involved in a tournament. Agents who only care about
their own payment choose a high e¤ort level at the equilibrium, whereas inequity averse
agents exert a very low e¤ort level that decreases with their degree of inequity aversion. The
equilibrium utility received by inequity averse agents is weak, which suggests a probable
desire to escape the tournament. Conclusions about the incentive e¤ect of tournaments
cannot be generalized to the whole working population when people are heterogeneous in
terms of social preferences.
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4 "Break-away" of fair-minded agents
In the previous section, no mobility of agents was allowed. In this section, we introduce rst
an outside option and identify which type of agents prefers to leave the tournament. Then,
we establish a second type of compensation scheme with no competition. We characterize
agents who are attracted by a revenue-sharing scheme among agents who choose the outside
option instead of the tournament. At the end of this section, we study whether a separating
equilibrium with selsh people compensated according to the tournament and inequity
averse people according to the revenue-sharing scheme exists.
4.1 An outside option
We consider an outside option, strategy X, which consists of staying out of the organiza-
tion, which means avoiding the tournament game. In the context of principal-agent theory,
the outside option gives individuals their reservation utility, u
¯
 0, which is identical for
all agents. As people who leave the tournament for the outside option are not directly con-
nected to other people, they do not compare their payo¤ to others. u
¯
is then independent
of otherspayo¤ even for fair-minded workers.
A selsh agent k prefers to work under the tournament than to take the outside option
if:
E [Vk(e

S)] = e

S   e2S  u¯ ()   2
p
u
¯
(8)
As the expected utility derived at the equilibrium by an inequity averse agent from be-
ing compensated according to a tournament is decreasing in  and , his participation
constraint is harder to be satised when his inequity aversion degrees are high. The par-
ticipation constraint is the following:
IIE [VA] = E [VA(e

A; e

A)] + (1  )E [VA(eA; eS)]  u¯ (9)
We characterize () such that E [VA(eA; e

A)] + (1  )E [VA(eA; eS)] = u¯ . Then, agents
with   () do not satisfy the tournament participation constraint and prefer to receive
their reservation utility than to work under the tournament. It is equivalent to saying that
when  and  are big enough, workers prefer to avoid the tournament because, caring too
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much about otherspayo¤s, their utility from earning a wage very di¤erent from that of
their opponent is lower than the one they can get from staying out of the organization. The
more the disadvantageous inequity aversion of the agent is high, the more the threshold
of advantageous inequity aversion necessary for the outside option to be preferable to the
tournament is low.
If inequity averse agents leave the tournament for an outside option, we must be sure
that once they have all left, i.e. once all the selsh workers are employed under the tour-
nament and all the inequity averse workers have chosen the outside option, they have no
interest in deviating which signies, to join the tournament when all the contestants are
selsh. We have E

VA(e
AS
A ; e

S)

= E [VA(e

A; e

S)] for  = 0. It implies that if inequality
(9) is unproven, E

VA(e
AS
A ; e

S)

< u
¯
is inevitably veried. Once all type tA agents with
  () have quit the tournament for their reservation utility, none of them have an
interest to deviate by going back into the tournament. We nd a unique equilibrium de-
scribed by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under incomplete information, if type tA agents are characterized by
  (), there exists a unique and separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with strategy
proles such that (eS j tS) and (X j tA) whatever the beliefs on agentstype.
Once the sorting done, none of the agents, whatever their type is, have an interest in
deviating from this situation. Moreover, no pooling situation is stable. When both types
of workers are employed under the tournament, inequity averse ones prefer to take the
outside option and selsh workers stay in the tournament. When all of them receive their
outside option, only selsh workers prefer to work under the tournament. For the remain-
der of the paper, we consider that advantageous inequity aversion of type tA workers is such
that   (). Indeed, the case we focus on corresponds to the situation in which inequity
averse workers prefer to avoid the tournament. Nevertheless, we will discuss di¤erent cases
corresponding to various inequity aversion levels in section 5.
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4.2 Another organizational structure: revenue-sharing
In the labor market, agents can choose the organization they prefer to work for. Indeed,
inequity averse agents may be more interested in working under a compensation scheme
which does not create such a strong inequality between workerspayo¤s. We consider here
another payment scheme more adapted to inequity averse workers in terms of expected
utility derived. Revenue-sharing reduces the spread between workersgross payo¤s to zero
by dividing equally the joint production between group members. This payment scheme
is related to public goods games in the sense that the whole group contribution is equally
shared between agents regardless of their personal investment. Consequently, agents who
do not care about the other group-members payo¤ free-ride14. However, the revenue-
sharing scheme may attract inequity averse agents with a high e¤ort level investment
provided that there are no free-riders in the group. We note ,  2 [0; 1], the share of the
joint-output distributed by the principal to agents.
Inequity averse agentsutility function is then written:
Ui(ei; ej) =
8>>><>>>:
1
2
(ei + ej)  e2i   
 
e2i   e2j

1
2
(ei + ej)  e2i   
 
e2j   e2i

1
2
(ei + ej)  e2i
if ei > ej
if ei < ej
if ei = ej
As we assume that agents compare their net payo¤s, even with an egalitarian distribution of
the output produced, the utility of agents is reduced if both group-members do not realize
the same e¤ort level. Selsh workers play their dominant strategy at the equilibrium,
e^S =

4
, which is what we call in the following the "free-riding equilibrium" whereas the
Pareto optimum is e^OP = 
2
. The equilibrium e¤ort level in pure strategies of inequity
averse workers is e^A = e^S as well if   + . At the same time, multiple equilibria exist for
inequity averse agents if the proportion of fair-minded people in the working population is
14When all players of the game are supposed to have no social considerations, to free-ride is the unique
equilibrium. The experimental evidence shows however that many people contribute more than the theory
predicts (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey) which supports a heterogeneity of types.
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high enough. Inequity averse agentsequilibrium e¤ort level is e^A such that:
e^A 2
8>>><>>>:
e^Sh
1
1+ (1 ) e^S; e^S
i
h
1
1+ (1 ) e^S;
1
1+(1 )  e^S
i
if   
+
if 
+
<   
+
if  > 
+
We consider that the equilibrium e¤ort level of inequity averse agents is never higher than
the Pareto optimum because whatever the strategy of j, the expected utility of agent i is
decreasing as his e¤ort level increases beyond the optimal e¤ort level (even without taking
into account the reduction in utility due to inequity). The unique Bayesian equilibrium is
the free-riding equilibrium when the proportion of inequity averse agents is not su¢ ciently
high. This proportion must be at least one half to possibly observe the equilibrium e¤ort
level of inequity averse agents higher than e^S. If both agents of each group are inequity
averse and this is common knowledge, multiple symmetric equilibria always exist.
Proposition 3 If it is common knowledge that all agents compensated under the revenue-
sharing payment scheme are type tA agents, there exist multiple symmetric equilibria e^A
such that: 
4(1+)
 e^A  4(1 ) . (10)
PROOF: see Appendix.
When it is common knowledge that all participants in the revenue-sharing organization
are fair-minded, the free-riding equilibrium is not unique. As type tA agents are supposed
to be identical, all the equilibria of the revenue-sharing game are symmetric. Their in-
terval increases with inequity aversion degrees: the lower bound of the equilibria set is
increasing with  and the upper bound with . Consequently, the Pareto optimum of the
revenue-sharing game, e^OP , becomes an equilibrium if it is common knowledge that all the
participants have a degree of advantageous inequity aversion high enough,   1
2
. Fair-
minded agents with  > 0 who avoid the tournament for the revenue-sharing scheme are
able to reach an equilibrium inducing a higher e¤ort level than the free-riding equilibrium
under the constraint that selsh workers do not join the revenue-sharing organization. Nev-
ertheless, the free-riding situation is still an equilibrium even if everybody is fair-minded
and aware of it. As we cannot assume that players coordinate their expectations on a
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particular equilibrium and as the Nash equilibrium concept does not resolve the problem
of multiple equilibria selection when strategies are weakly dominated, we need to apply
one of its renements to restrict the set of equilibria. The concept of forward induction
permits this equilibria selection15.
To verify the existence of a separating equilibrium, we assume rst that all agents
working under the revenue-sharing scheme are inequity averse. We study the conditions
for advantageous inequity aversion to allow for a symmetric equilibrium with e¤ort levels
strictly higher than e^S. Once this is determined, we will check the stability of the situation
and if a pooling equilibrium can exist.
An inequity averse agent i prefers to work under the revenue-sharing scheme than to
take the outside option if Ui(e^A; e^A)  u¯ with e^A 2
h

4(1+)
; 
4(1 )
i
. Then, the forward
induction concept species that an agent choosing the revenue-sharing scheme sends a
signal to other agents that he enters the game with the objective of earning more than u
¯
,
i.e. he wants to reach an equilibrium, e^A, from the set of possible equilibria dened by (10)
such that Ui(e^A; e^A)  u¯ () e^A   e^
2
A  u¯ . If we assume e¯A being the e¤ort level which
keeps the worker indi¤erent between the outside option and the revenue-sharing scheme,
i.e. e
¯A
  e
¯
2
A = u¯
() e
¯A
=
 
p
2 4u
¯
2
, and eA, the maximum equilibrium e¤ort level
reachable, increasing with , eA =
8<: 2
4(1 )
if  2 1
2
; 1

if  2
h
^; 1
2
 , the set of equilibria is then
restricted to e^A such that e^A 2 [e¯A; eA]. In order to have e¯A higher than the free-riding
equilibrium and lower than the optimum, we impose:
 2
"
2
p
u
¯
;
4
p
3
3
p
u
¯
#
(11)
An agent with   ^ prefers to enter the revenue-sharing organization than to take the
15The main theoretical works about the concept of forward induction includes Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986), van Damme (1989) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002). Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) treat a
very similar intuition to ours although they do not base workerscharacteristics on the Fehr and Schmidts
model. They show that forward induction makes the selection of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium pos-
sible in a coordination game with discrete strategies (they use another group incentive game: "forcing
contracts"). According to the denition advanced by Cooper et al. (1992), a coordination game consists of
multiple, Pareto-rankable and pure strategy Nash equilibria. Henceforth, the revenue-sharing game with
players having a su¢ ciently high advantageous inequity aversion is included in this category of games.
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outside option. The advantageous inequity aversion threshold is then:
^ = 1  
4e
¯A
(12)
For the remaining of the paper, we assume that inequity averse agents have an advantageous
inequity aversion degree verifying   ^ in addition to    ().
This restriction on advantageous inequity aversion allows us to observe equilibrium
e¤ort levels with revenue-sharing higher than e^S. Nevertheless, an equilibrium with e¤ort
levels higher than the free-riding strategy does exist if and only if no selsh worker has
an incentive to enter this organizational structure. Each group is composed once agents
have entered the revenue-sharing game, which means that an agent having chosen to leave
the tournament and not to take the outside option infers that he plays with someone
who made the same choice as him. Consequently, both workers send a signal about their
intentions to play an e¤ort level equal to or higher than e
¯A
. The necessary and su¢ cient
condition to observe this high e¤ort levels equilibrium is that selsh agents prefer to work
under the tournament than to join the revenue-sharing organization and take advantage of
fair-minded workers by playing their dominant strategy, e^S, which is to free-ride. Due to
the di¢ culty for people to coordinate on the same equilibrium strategy under the revenue-
sharing scheme with certainty, this condition must be veried 8e^A 2 [e¯A; eA]. It is written:
E [VS(e

S)]  max
e^A2[e¯A;eA]
US(e^A; e^S)() E [VS(eS)]  US(eA; e^S)
eA is the maximum equilibrium e¤ort level for inequity averse agents and it provides the
maximum expected utility for selsh agents who free-ride.
It is equivalent to: eS   2 (eA + e^S)  e2S   e^2S
()
8<: 4 2   52  04 2(1  )  2 (3  )  0
if  2 1
2
; 1

if  2
h
^; 1
2
 (13)
Condition (13) is veried if the share of the joint-output given to the agent who won the
tournament,  , is high enough and the share of the joint-output given to the agents in the
revenue-sharing scheme, , is low enough. The larger , the higher the upper bound of
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the equilibria set and then, the higher the utility derived by a selsh worker who shirks.
Hence, inequality (13) is harder to verify than when  is low.
Inequity averse agents prefer to work in the revenue-sharing organization once the two
types of agents are sorted into the di¤erent payment schemes:
E

VA(e
AS
A ; e

S)
  min
e^A
UA(e^A; e^A)8e^A such that UA(e^A; e^A)  u¯
() E VA(eASA ; eS)  u¯
We showed in subsection 4.1 that this inequality is always veried if the advantageous
inequity aversion of type tA workers is such that   (), which means that inequity
averse workers never gain from leaving the revenue-sharing scheme for the tournament.
Therefore, a separating equilibrium exists in which all people are as well o¤ or better
o¤ than when everybody plays the tournament. Inequity averse agents who choose the
outside option in preference to the tournament when there is no available alternative pre-
fer to move to the revenue-sharing organization. It leads to proposition 4 showing that
once agents are sorted such that selsh agents choose the tournament and inequity averse
agents choose the revenue-sharing scheme, nobody has an incentive to deviate. Moreover,
this separating equilibrium is unique and no pooling situation is stable.
Proposition 4 A unique and separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with strategy proles
such that (eS j tS) and (e^A j tA) and beliefs such that bi(tS j eS) = bi(tA j e^A) = 1 exists if
 and  are such that inequality (13) is satised.
PROOF: see Appendix.
Fair-minded agents receive a very low expected utility when they work in an organiza-
tion applying a competitive compensation scheme yielding to a dramatic ex post inequality
between group-members payo¤s. For su¢ ciently high inequity aversion degrees, these
workers are even willing to quit the tournament to receive only their reservation utility
in order to avoid this important inequality. If we consider another organization which
distributes equally the joint-output between group-members, we observe that agents with
su¢ ciently high degrees of inequity aversion leave the tournament for the revenue-sharing
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organization under the condition that selsh workers have an incentive to stay in the tour-
nament and inequity averse agents have an incentive to participate in the revenue-sharing
scheme instead of staying out of the production process. Hence, all agents realize a positive
and high e¤ort level in their job. (1   ) is the share of workers compensated according
to the tournament and  the share choosing the revenue-sharing scheme. The object now
is to analyze the optimal contract for the principal. On the one hand, she must decide
the percentage of groupsjoint output to include in workerswages. On the other hand,
she must choose which payment scheme, between the tournament and the revenue-sharing
scheme, to implement or both of them with agents allowed to self-select.
5 The optimal contract
We showed in the previous section that inequity averse agents prefer to run away from
the tournament for an egalitarian partnership payment scheme while selsh agents have
a higher expected utility under tournaments. The incentive e¤ect of both performance-
based payment schemes are then improved when agents are allowed to self-select into the
organization using the compensation mode most adapted to their preferences. The sorting
of workers into the two compensation schemes implies homogeneous groups in the sense that
workers in a particular group have the same type of social preferences, in terms of inequity
aversion. Knowing that they are working with someone having the same orientation, the
incentive e¤ect of each payment scheme is improved. None of the agents decide to stay out
of both games, which means that every agent adds his contribution to the global output
by working, which is not the case in the presence of the tournament alone. Not considering
the possible self-selection of agents who di¤er in their degree of inequity aversion may lead
to a very important misunderstanding of organizationsincentives design. We show here
that o¤ering workers the choice between the two di¤erent variable compensation schemes
is benecial to both employees and employers.
In this game, we consider that the market is perfectly exible. Both types of agents
can choose their organizational structure, i.e. their compensation system, without any
restriction. Consequently, this game consists of three stages:
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 1st stage: a principal chooses to o¤er only a tournament payment scheme or a
revenue-sharing scheme, or both the tournament and the revenue-sharing compensa-
tion schemes, with optimal  and ;
 2nd stage: agents choose simultaneously to enter the tournament (T ), the revenue-
sharing organization (R) or to take the outside option (X);
 3rd stage: agents who chose to participate in one of the two games at the 1st stage
are matched with another agent having done the same choice and then, they simul-
taneously decide their e¤ort level without any information about the type of their
co-worker.
We have resolved 2nd and 3rd stages in the previous sections. We know the equilibrium
e¤ort levels of agents when only the tournament or the revenue-sharing scheme or the
tournament and the revenue-sharing scheme are proposed to the workers. The rst step is
now to dene the optimal contract for the principal in each situation. Her action variables
are the share of the global output given to workers under the tournament,  , and the
revenue-sharing scheme, .
The maximization program of the principal when she proposes only the tournament is
written:
max
 tour
tour = (1  )(1  )eS
s:t:  2 [2pu
¯
; 1] (8)
The optimal share16 is  tour =
1
2
.
When she proposes only the revenue-sharing scheme, her maximization program is:
max
rev
8<: rev = (1  )e^Srev = (1  ) (e^A + (1  ) e^S)
if   
+
if  > 
+
s:t:  2
"
2
p
u
¯
;
4
p
3
3
p
u
¯
#
(11)
16We assume u
¯
 116 in order to be more realistic and to obtain an optimal contract independant of
people reservation utility; if u
¯
> 116 , 

tour = 2
p
u
¯
.
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The optimal share is then rev =
1
2
.
The o¤er of the tournament or the revenue-sharing when we consider mono-organizational
structures depends on the percentage of inequity averse agents in the whole working pop-
ulation. The higher , the higher the principals prot under the revenue-sharing scheme
and the lower under the tournament. Consequently, the principals interest in using the
tournament mechanism design is decreasing with 17.
The principals maximization program is subject to an additional cost when she pro-
poses both the tournament and the revenue-sharing scheme and allows the agents to self-
select. In fact, the positive e¤ect derived from the o¤er of both payment schemes lies in
the existence of the unique separating equilibrium. This is possible if and only if constraint
(13) is veried. The program is the following18:
max
selec; selec
selec = (1  )(1  )eS + (1  )e^A with e^A 2 [e¯A; eA]
s:t:(8) (11) (13)
We note e^A = 4(1 ) . The optimal share given to agents in the tournament, 

selec, is an
increasing linear function of the share given to the agents in the revenue-sharing scheme:
 selec =
p
5
2
selec if  2

1
2
; 1

and  selec =
p
(3 )(1 )
2(1 ) 

selec if  2
h
^; 1
2

.
selec =
8<:
p
5(1 )(1 )+
5 3 5(1 )
A(1 )(1 )+(1 )
3  3(1 ) (1+ (1 ))
with  2
h
^; 1
2
i
if  2 1
2
; 1

with  2
h
^; 
i
if  2
h
^; 1
2

, A =
p
3  4 + 2
The principal increases the share given to the workers in the revenue-sharing scheme as
the proportion of fair-minded agents in the whole population rises. Moreover, this share
increases with , which indicates the level of the e¤ective equilibrium e¤ort level. Nev-
ertheless, nobody is able to evaluate correctly e^A, which means that the principal must
establish the contract based on his expectations concerning the equilibrium e¤ort level
played in various groups. Therefore, the less accurate his estimation of e^A, the greater the
17tour  rev if 0    12 when   1+ (case 1) and if 0   
 (1+)
p
2(1+)
1  when  >

1+ (case
2). We can note that if 0   < 1, the tournament is always prefered to the revenue-sharing in case 1,
but, in case 2, the tournament may be chosen only if 0   < 1.
18As we cannot select a unique equilibrium under the revenue-sharing scheme, we must consider the
whole set of equilibria as a possible situation.
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distance between his prot and the optimal prot.
At the optimum, we obtain:8<: selec ( selec; selec)  tour ( tour)selec ( selec; selec)  rev (rev) 8e^A 2 [e¯A; eA] and 8 2
h
^; 1

(14)
Proposition 5 If the principal knows  with certainty and that the inequity averse agents
have an advantageous inequity aversion greater than () and ^, she always prefers to
o¤er both payment schemes and to allow agents to self-select into these di¤erent payment
schemes.
The principal always prots by proposing both the tournament and the revenue sharing
payment schemes and to allow agents to choose one of them according to their individual
preferences instead of one payment device alone. The prot deduced is strictly increasing
with the e¤ort level equilibrium under the revenue-sharing scheme. Although a positive
proportion of inequity averse agents induces superior prots when the principal proposes
both payment schemes, these prots are increasing with the proportion of inequity averse
agents only if the equilibrium e¤ort level under the revenue sharing scheme equals or al-
most equals the Pareto optimum under the condition that  is high enough19. It is clearly
decreasing for e^A such that  2
h
^; 0:493
i
. This may be explained by the fact that the
optimal share given to workers is increasing with , which is then more costly for the
principal.
The share given to agents under the tournament depends positively on . There-
fore, when the population is exclusively composed of selsh people, the principal adapts
selec and 

selec to the context and 

selec = 

tour. When constraint (13) is veried, selsh
agents choose the tournament with certainty and then, we obtain selec (

selec; 

selec) =
tour (

tour). Therefore, as soon as the principal knows with certainty the proportion of
the working population who have social preferences, she has a strict advantage in propos-
19To be more precise, the necessary condition to observe @

selec
@ > 0 is to have e^A such that 0:493 <   12
if   12 . If  2
h
^; 12

, the interval on  and  is even more reducted and cases are such rare that we
consider only cases related to   12 . Few examples: for  = 0:493,  > 0:996 is needed to obtain
@selec
@ > 0; for  = 0:497,  > 0:75 is needed; for  = 0:5,  > 0:528 is needed.
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ing both compensation modes. Nevertheless, she may not know  perfectly and in this
case, she must make an estimation ^ = + with  2 [ ; 1  ]. To over-estimate  is
the most costly to the principal because it induces higher  selec and 

selec than necessary.
However, allowing agents to self-select into the organizational structure they prefer almost
always leads to higher prots than proposing only one payment scheme. It is protable for
the principal to o¤er the tournament alone only for values of  very closed to 0 ( < 0:028).
Even if the principal makes some estimation errors about the proportion of inequity averse
people in the working population, it is unlikely that he would lose prots by o¤ering both
payment schemes.
To o¤er an organizational choice to agents is then in everyones interest. On the one
hand, all workers realize a high e¤ort level due to the realization of homogeneous groups
driven by workerschoices. Selsh people work under the tournament and inequity averse
people under the revenue-sharing. On the other hand, the principal gains from propos-
ing both payment schemes to agents and allowing for self-selection, through the global
improvement of workersproductivity. Pareto gains are then achieved.
In our game, we consider a single rm, represented by a principal, who decides to o¤er
one payment scheme, the tournament or the revenue-sharing scheme, or both compensation
schemes. Her optimal behavior is overwhelmingly the last option. Another formalization
would have been to suppose that several rms are allowed to propose simultaneously one
type of variable payment scheme each. In this case, the self-selection of agents would be
realized between rms. Our result is robust to this change under the assumption that
people move to another rm only if it assures them a strictly higher utility. We observe
that there exists a unique equilibrium which separates the two types of agents into the
two di¤erent payment schemes when rms are subject to competition to attract workers if
inequality (13) is veried20.
20Suppose that there is one rm on the market using only one payment scheme. A new rm has an
interest in entering the market and o¤ering the payment scheme so far absent to attract one type of
workers. Both rms realize a positive prot in this case. Then, other rms wish to enter this market
as well. Companies who o¤er the tournament receive zero prots ( = 1) at the equilibrium because
of competition. Companies who o¤er the revenue-sharing collect positive prots because of the upper
bound of  due to the verication of inequality (13). This situation is stable because rms who o¤er the
tournament have no interest in deviating by proposing the revenue-sharing scheme. Indeed, they would
get no worker by choosing  =  and would cancel the separating equilibrium by choosing  > . In this
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6 Discussion
Some assumptions of our study require a discussion. First, we discuss the optimal behav-
ior of the principal for all possible degrees of inequity aversion of inequity averse agents.
Indeed, in our study, we assumed    () and   ^. Secondly, we analyze whether our
results are robust when the principal derives an additional benet from cooperation under
the revenue-sharing scheme. Then, we propose qualitative results when endogenous pay-
ment schemes are considered and nally, we suggest intuitions for long term interactions.
We have assumed throughout the paper that inequity aversion of agents is such that they
prefer to leave the tournament for an outside option,    (), but prefer to participate
in another game, revenue sharing, instead of the outside option,   ^. Nevertheless, other
cases exist. They are represented in the following graph.
1
α
β
Fig. 1. Different categories of workers as a function of a and b
-1
*b
bˆ
XRSandTX ff
RSXandTX ff
RSXandXT ff
XRSandXT ff
According to the graph, we can di¤erentiate four cases. We rst assume that the range
of degrees of inequity aversion of inequity averse agents is common knowledge for all agents
and the principal. In case 1, represented by lines on the graph, the principal proposes both
case, selsh workers would be attracted by the revenue-sharing organization and destroy any cooperation.
Moreover, prots realized by rms o¤ering the revenue-sharing scheme is decreasing with the number of
rms. For a large number of these rms, their prots would tend to zero.
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payment schemes (case analyzed previously) and his optimal prot is selec. In case 2,
in white, no inequity averse agent chooses to enter either game (   () and  < ^)
then, the principal chooses to implement only the tournament and his prot is tour with
a unique equilibrium e¤ort level, eS. In cases 3 and 4, symbolized by dots, the principal
proposes only the tournament and his prot is tour with e

S and e

A at the equilibrium
21,
noted (<
())tour. If we suppose that the principal cannot observe the level of the social
preferences of agents, she has to take into account probabilities on ranges of  and 
to decide to implement only the tournament or to give workers the choice between the
tournament and the revenue-sharing scheme. In fact, it is more costly for the principal
to o¤er both payment schemes than only the tournament because she has to implement
a higher  in order to verify inequality (13) which is the condition for the existence of
a unique separating equilibrium. We note by p1 the probability of observing inequity
aversion degrees such that    () and   ^, by p2 the probability that    ()
and  < ^ and by p3 the probability that  < 
 (). She proposes a choice between
payment schemes, under the constraint that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, if22:
p1

selec (

selec; 

selec)  p2tour ( tour) + p3 (<
())Tour (

tour) (15)
Replacing p2 by 1   p1   p3, we nd that inequality (15) is veried if p3 is not too big
and p1 is high enough. The inequality is harder to satisfy with increasing p3. As a general
result, the probability that  and  are such that  <  () must be low enough while
the probability to have  and  such that    () and   ^ must be high enough in
order to observe the o¤er of both tournament and revenue sharing schemes to agents and
to allow them to self-select.
In our framework, we consider the marginal return of e¤ort investment equal to one
under the revenue-sharing scheme. In public goods games, the e¤ort productivity is usu-
ally higher than one, as cooperation is benecial. To take this into account, we could
change the gross payment from 
2
Q to 
2
Q:g with g 2 [1; 2]. A separating equilibrium
is still achievable at the cost of an incentive constraint more restrictive than (13) but is
21The optimal  is equal to tour.
22As the expected prot function of the principal is di¤erent from that of the previous section, we
maximized the one considered here to nd the optimal contract and it is shown that there is no di¤erence
between the two cases. The optimal  is equal to tour.
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also compensated by an increase in the equilibrium e¤ort level under the revenue-sharing
scheme. Therefore, considering a marginal return on investment higher than one does not
change the conclusions presented previously.
The robustness of our results must be veried when the nature of the alternative pay-
ment scheme to the tournament is chosen by the principal herself. Another potential model
would be to consider an alternative option to the tournament as a linear combination of
the tournament and the revenue-sharing schemes. Agentsutility function would become:
Zi (ei; ej) = kVi (ei; ej) + (1  k)Ui (ei; ej). After having derived equilibrium e¤ort levels
for both types of agents under this design, we found a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the existence of a separating equilibrium which depends on k. The principal settles
on the optimal contract which consists of choosing k,   and . For inequity aversion
degrees of type tA agents su¢ ciently high, they accept to work under the alternative or-
ganization instead of the tournament only if k is small23. The structure of the alternative
option is optimal because its parameters, and especially k, are determined by the prin-
cipal. Therefore, to make the alternative payment scheme endogeneous does not change
qualitatively our results. A separating equilibrium between types of agents does exist and
agentsself-selection is then induced.
Our nal remark concerns the length of the interactions. We analyzed one period in-
teractions between agents to emphasize the impact of fairness preferences on incentives.
We can show that the sorting improves workersproductivity even for long-term relations.
In a revenue-sharing scheme, a long-term interaction may lead to a decline in cooperation.
However, when all the agents are fair-minded, the cooperation might last even if interac-
tions are repeated over many time periods. In tournaments, it is known that incentives
can be weakened because of collusion which emerges between agents when prizes are xed.
If all the agents in the tournament do not dislike inequalities, this collusion might not
appear.
23Due to the complexity of the function and the numerous variables, the results are not tractable
analytically. We decided to report only the intuition here.
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7 Conclusion
The main nding of our study is that one particular group incentive mechanism cannot
be e¢ cient when the working population is heterogeneous in terms of social preferences
such as inequity aversion. In a real company setting, multiple performance-based payment
schemes are needed to insure adapted incentives for di¤erent types of agents. In terms
of e¢ ciency, when agentsdegree of inequity aversion is private information, it is better
to o¤er multiple schemes provided that people can choose where to work if the market is
perfectly exible.
People di¤ering in their social preferences react di¤erently when set in a competitive
environment. Agents who are exclusively concerned by their own payo¤ are strongly and
positively a¤ected by this kind of incentives. However, inequity averse agents who dis-
like ex post inequality between payo¤s exert a low e¤ort level in equilibrium under the
tournament. They prefer to opt out of the tournament if their advantageous and disad-
vantageous inequity aversion are high enough. Agents with social preferences are better
o¤ under a payment scheme which shares equally the joint output between the workers of
the group. Their equilibrium e¤ort level in the revenue-sharing scheme is higher than the
free-riding equilibrium if it is common knowledge that all the agents in the revenue-sharing
organization are fair-minded.
If there is no mobility cost, we show that there exists a unique and separating equilib-
rium when the principal o¤ers both payment schemes, the tournament and the revenue-
sharing scheme, and allows agents to self-select. Selsh agents prefer to work under the
tournament and inequity averse agents prefer to work under the revenue-sharing scheme
if their degree of inequity aversion is high enough. The necessary and su¢ cient condition
for this situation to be stable is that selsh workers do not want to join the revenue-
sharing structure. In this case, no pooling issue is sustainable in equilibrium. Besides,
mono-organizational structures are not available in the sense that they are unstable. The
creation of a new structure implementing the payment scheme not so far available on the
market is always protable through the attraction of one type of agents. The optimal
contract for the principal is then to o¤er both payment schemes and to allow agents to
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self-select into these two di¤erent payment schemes whatever the proportion of fair-minded
agents.
The conclusions of this paper highlight the importance of considering workers self-
selection based on social preferences heterogeneity when they have the possibility to choose
their payment scheme. Indeed, a particular performance-based payment scheme is not e¢ -
cient for the whole working population in terms of incentives. A business environment that
allows people to select their payment scheme may induce an identication of personality
types ex post. Homogeneous groups are composed and adapted incentives applied to the
corresponding individuals. Self-selection of workers is then an important aspect of e¢ cient
work incentive schemes.
An extension of this study would be to di¤erentiate agents by their skill levels. Agents
ability may have an impact on their e¤ort decision and on their choice of payment schemes
also. High-skilled agents may be more likely to prefer competition than low-skilled agents.
It may be interesting to analyze if it is in everyones interest to have homogeneous groups
in terms of both abilities and social preferences. Risk aversion of agents would be another
individual characteristic to consider. When agents have diverse personality types, self-
selection leads to a more e¢ cient exploitation of the di¤ering incentives provided by variable
payment schemes.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. As Ui(ei; ej) is di¤erent when ei > ej and ei < ej, we check the
conditions under which player i of type tA does not have an incentive to deviate.
Type tA workers are assumed identical so, they have the same equilibrium strategy.
We consider a situation with symmetric strategies (e^A; e^A) and we check whether agents
have an interest in deviating.
- Deviation for ei > e^A?
The worker does not deviate if Ui(e^A; e^A)  Ui(ei; e^A)
() e^A   e^2A  12 (ei + e^A)  e2i    (e2i   e^2A)
() e^A  2(1+)   ei
As the equilibrium is symmetric,
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() e^A  4(1+)
It means that a worker of type tA does not want to deviate from the situation (e^A; e^A) for
ei > e^A if e^A is such that e^A  4(1+) .
We use the same method to determine if type tA workers have an incentive to deviate to
a lower e¤ort level.
- Deviation for ei < e^A?
The worker does not deviate if Ui(e^A; e^A)  Ui(ei; e^A)
() e^A   e^2A  12 (ei + e^A)  e2i    (e^2A   e2i )
() e^A  2(1 )   ei
As the equilibrium is symmetric,
() e^A  4(1 )
It means that a worker of type tA does not want to deviate from the issue (e^A; e^A) for
ei < e^A if e^A is such that e^A  4(1 ) .
Proof of Proposition 4. Two sorts of equilibria may exist: separating (each type of agents
work under a di¤erent payment scheme) and pooling (both types of agents work under the
same payment scheme) equilibria. We rst check whether pooling equilibria may exist.
- Suppose a situation such that both types of people work under the tournament. As we
showed in the previous section, this situation is unstable because inequity averse workers
have an interest in leaving the tournament for the outside option because
E [VA(e

A; e

A)] + (1   )E [VA(eA; eS)] < u¯ . Then, a pooling equilibrium under the tour-
nament does not exist. Imagine a situation in which both personality types work in a
revenue-sharing organization. As inequality (13) is veried, selsh agents prefer to leave
the revenue-sharing scheme for the tournament whatever the strategy of inequity averse
agents. This second situation is then not stable. Finally, suppose a situation such that
both types prefer the outside option. This situation is not stable because we know from
section 4:1: that selsh agents prefer to work under the tournament than to take the out-
side option. Consequently, no pooling equilibrium subsists if there exists an incentive
compatible constraint that causes selsh agents to derive a higher expected utility under
the tournament. No option (the tournament, the revenue-sharing scheme or the outside
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option) is ever accepted by both types of agents.
The second thing which must be clear is the uniqueness of the separating equilibrium.
- Suppose that selsh people work under the tournament and inequity averse ones under
the outside option. We know that inequity averse agents have no interest to go to the
tournament but they may be attracted by a revenue-sharing scheme. Knowing that in-
equality (13) is veried, they join the revenue-sharing organization and play an equilibrium
strategy higher than that of the free-riding equilibrium. Suppose that selsh people choose
the outside option and inequity averse people choose the revenue-sharing scheme. This
separating situation is not stable because selsh workers prefer to leave the outside option
to go to work under the tournament.
Consequently, selsh people working under the tournament and inequity averse ones under
the revenue-sharing scheme is the unique equilibrium. Agents realize their equilibrium
e¤ort level under each payment scheme which is to realize a high e¤ort level.
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